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Under Siege: How Private Security Companies Threaten the Military Profession
The September 11 th , 2012 terrorists attack on the U.S. consulate at Benghazi that killed four American Citizens caused the public and political leaders to justifiably question the military's role in prevention and the response in protecting its sovereign territory and people. 1 The fact is that private security companies now frequently secure U.S. diplomats and embassies-a function traditionally performed by the U.S. Marines until 1985-and often do so by relying on host nation labor. 2 Beyond the recent security crisis at American consulate in Benghazi, there is real risk of the U.S. military fulfilling a historical pattern of post-war decline. The end of a conflict often is marked by social fatigue with war and a desire to reap peace dividends.
In the 20 th century these combined pressures typically yielded a reduction in the military's budget. The reduced budget degraded forces structure and decreased the quality of the U.S. defense establishment. The full effects of such reductions frequently become apparent at the start of the next conflict, when the U.S. military is found inadequately sized, burdened with old equipment, and trapped with an ill-suited doctrine. 3 Unlike in past interwar periods, contemporary actions short of war (such as regional security and "mil to mil" exchanges) as well as the need to restructure the force for other forms of conflict besides counterinsurgency will place a significant peacetime The quality of the U.S. military profession ultimately defines the nature of U.S.
civil-military relations, which in turn contributes to the character of its democracy. 
Defining the Military Profession
Sociologists generally define a profession as an occupation based on theoretical and practical knowledge that conducts special training and self regulates its members such that it is credentialed by society with special authority. 4 Continued fulfillment of these expectations allows society to renew the profession's authority and autonomy. In the U.S., society credentials two organizations with the authority to employ lethal issue was what made the profession effective. 5 Huntington argued that the best way to protect civil-military relations was through objective control of the military. The required 4 apolitical nature was to be achieved through focused education on the military art and inculcation of the military ethic to serve the state in a non-partisan fashion. 6 In contrast, Janowitz offered that the emergence and proliferation of nuclear weapons required a constabulary force where the military professional officer "is subject to civilian control, not only because of the 'rule of law' and tradition, but also because of self imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values." . 10 The departments' efforts are intended to improve organizational effectiveness (over efficiency) and in so doing maintain the society's trust; thus preserving the pattern of civil-military relations enjoyed since the advent of the AVF.
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The U.S. military profession is credentialed by society based on the expectation that it will discharge its duties without detailed external oversight. For the military profession, "society" represents the sum authority granted by three actors-civilian chain of command, public at large, and subordinate members-with whom a trust relationship must be maintained. 12 The RPA explicitly recognizes the importance of these three relationships, but follows service precedent and focuses activity on just one, the nurturing the profession by strengthening the trust held by subordinates. An over reliance on this traditional approach could make the RPA's actions inadequate and consequently allow PSCs to become an alternative agent in civil-military relations.
Strengthening the military profession in a post conflict, fiscally constrained environment is problematic; Agency Theory explains the tension inherent in fulfilling the three required relationships.
Feaver's application of "Agency Theory" to U.S. civil-military relations argues that civilian leaders as the "principal' know what they want done, and the military as the "agent" interprets this policy goal (end) and acts with the required means, method, and 6 use of force. The degree of compliance by the military (the agent) reflects the probability of sanction from civilian leadership (the principal) as well as the degree of shared understanding and value of the outcome. As long as the outcomes are found acceptable by the principal, the agent is retained in the relationship. 13 Historically, ethical dilemmas in this principal-agent relationship centered on dissent; how dissent would be expressed by the agent and received by the principal. 14 The introduction of PSCs as another actor credentialed to apply lethal force in combat on behalf of the state has changed the structure of this relationship. The challenge now is to understand whether the structure erodes the profession of arms and by extension, could affect civil-military relations.
The U.S. Military Profession as Part of a System of Professions
Significant scholarship and fifty years of application by DOD have demonstrated the utility of developing the military profession with a functional approach. Ongoing social changes and recent events however beg the question of the adequacy of that theoretical approach. For example, the military has executed more than ten years of persistent conflict with a compounding effect of further bureaucratization of its professional culture. 15 Concurrently, across the globe there is increased conflict and economic contraction that will define the future. The challenge for military and civilian leaders in this environment is to strengthen the profession of arms to ensure adequate military capacity that is responsive to the state. Recent scholarship offers that the military profession can be better understood with the application of a systems paradigm.
Abbott theorized that professions form a complex and dynamic social system in a competitive environment where they will adapt or disappear based on their relative performance of work. Each profession's ability to garner resources and control a body of knowledge and clientele determines whether they will endure. This system is influenced 7 not only by its own processes but also by larger social forces and other individual professions that also change commensurate to the same macro social forces. 16 In contrast to the functional models of Huntington and Janowitz that assessed a profession's effectiveness, a systems model gauges the strength of a profession by the breadth, scope and social value of its work-the greater these characteristics, the larger its jurisdiction.
On few occasions new technologies create a new demand with an associated jurisdiction that will ultimately be secured by either a new or existing profession. 17 More commonly, a change of professional jurisdictions results when the demand for the services provided by a profession increase faster than the governing profession can respond, then either emerging professions or other existing professions complete the work instead. The outcomes of such jurisdictional challenges are not fixed, but are heavily influenced by the type and nature of the response of the actors within the system. 18 The current jurisdiction of the military profession, and the subordinate service professions, reflects its history as part of a larger system of professions. 19 The systems model of professions has driven significant contemporary research on the military profession although the central premise that a democracy is best served by a military governed by a profession remained unchanged. 20 Thus, the significance of answering whether PSCs have encroached on the U.S. military jurisdiction remains.
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 was a watershed event for the U.S. military profession as the AVF encountered two conditions for the first time: a) core task expansion as the military undertook "peace keeping" missions and, b) an American desire for a "peace dividend" that reduced the Army end strength from 780,815 to 8 495,000. 21 To mitigate the shortfall in manpower the Army developed the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. 22 The consequences of this shift remained masked until the 1990s when the demand for forces in the Balkans resulted in the Army ceding some jurisdiction for base support operations, first to the Joint Force and then to contractors in an effort to husband resources for combat operations. 23 The subsequent recognition of an inadequate force structure, as well as a desire to harness a perceived Revolution in Military Affairs, and increase DOD efficiency by introducing market competitiveness created significant environmental change. 24 Accordingly, Office of Management and Budget Circular 76 accelerated and expanded the scope of contractor utilization across all of DOD to increase military capability without raising end-strength. 25 The magnitude of the consequences that resulted from increased outsourcing became evident early in Operation Iraqi Freedom when the contractor to service member ratio became 1 to 10 (an increase from 1 to 50 for Desert Storm in 1991). 26 While the military was arguably more cost efficient, the reduced force structure proved inadequate for the military to train itself and coalition partners, or protect the force on the modern non-contiguous battlefield.
Prior to this expansion of contractor roles and duties, jurisdictional competition over military work was framed in one of three relationships. First, competition was framed as inter-service rivalry within DOD-a condition for resolution by civilian authority based the expert knowledge of each service. 27 Second, other scholars detail intra-state jurisdictional competition between governmental agencies-such as the Department of State (DOS). 28 Lastly, jurisdictional competition occurred transnationally where the U.S. military competed with other militaries to perform international missions-such as counter terrorism training. 29 As the GWOT progressed additional second order effects of contracting became more apparent. A fourth competitive relationship emerged where private companies began to compete with the U.S. military for jurisdiction over its core task-the employment of lethal force. In 2004 Deborah
Avant argued that, Its [Army's] ready use of contractors for tasks that are crucial to both the development of the profession in the future and to the success of new missions (such as stabilization), however, has generated competition between the Army and private security companies over who will shape the development of the future professionals and has degraded the Army's ability to undertake successful missions on its own. 30 The increased use of private security and training companies in a combat zone PSCs. 45 The acceptance of news and periodicals stories of PSC as warriors on the front lines provides a third indicator of the ongoing PSCs' public claims for jurisdiction over state sanctioned application of lethal force. 46 Lastly, and arguably most compelling,
PSCs argue publically that they are more cost effective (as a result of no long term obligations to the institution or the workforce) and timely (can rapidly mobilize) than the military. 47 PSCs publically claim immediate cost savings without a counter argument as to the long-term effects on military force structure and capabilities. in Iraq and Afghanistan. 51 These trends indicate significant incursion by PSCs into the workplace and that the jurisdictional claim of PSCs has expanded-rather than contracted-as U.S. military involvement in a combat zone declined.
Analysis of Jurisdiction Settlements
Competition between professions forces each profession to adapt and secure its jurisdiction or become a bureaucracy and/or an occupation. 52 A profession's failure to successfully accomplish work assigned by the client puts at risk its public legitimacy and the accompanying exclusive rights bestowed by the client. 53 This creates a cycle where the more bureaucratic a profession becomes the less capable it is of adapting to environmental changes. It may be unable to meet increased demand or defend its jurisdiction. Conversely, adaptation by an emerging profession or a challenger produces the means to claim a jurisdiction in legal, public, or workplace arenas.
These claims in turn produce one of five types of settlements arranged on a continuum. First, one of the actors can be awarded full jurisdiction in a zero sum gain arrangement. These are rare but most enduring. Second, one of the actors can be subordinated to the other. This typically occurs when dangerous work must be 15 accomplished routinely. Subordination as a form of resolution makes for a complicated work place and can invite intra-professional competition. Third, the claim could be divided among the actors with each becoming a formal profession, independently responsible to society. Midway between a formal division and subordination lies the intellectual settlement. In this manner one profession retains authority and responsibility for the abstract knowledge while competitors operate on an unrestricted basis. This produces an inherently unstable jurisdiction. The weakest and shortest-lived form of control over jurisdiction results from the fifth outcome, advisory jurisdiction. In these arrangements, one profession claims independent authority to interpret another profession's actions as its jurisdiction. For example the clergy may interpret and explain the larger meaning of medical conditions to patients. 54 Given the magnitude and scope of the aforementioned competition, it is not surprising that settlements continue to emerge in an inconclusive or contradictory manner.
Full Jurisdiction Settlements
In terms of protecting civil-military relations guaranteeing full jurisdiction to the U.S. military as the state's agent for lethal force would certainly protect the traditional structure of modern U.S. civil-military relations. Typically full jurisdiction results from a period of protracted contest but can come from an act of fiat, such as a legal decision.
In the 2009 NDAA Congress expressed "that private security contractors should not perform certain functions, such as security protection of resources, in high-threat operational environments, and that DOD regulations 'should ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area of combat operations.'" 55 This legal directive acknowledged the military had come to rely heavily on PSCs to complete its mission and required DOD to reconcile the intent of the law with conditions on the ground. It presented a nuanced interpretation that did, "not prohibit the use of contract personnel for security, but it limits the extent to which contract personnel may be hired to guard military installations." 56 The same legislation also specified that the "Combatant Commander has the authority to decide whether to classify security functions as commercial." 57 In theory this caveat allows military commanders some degree of authority to protect the U.S. military's professional jurisdiction based on their ability to define the scope of security tasks suitable for contract work.
In reality, senior commanders (the agent) met political leaders' (the principal)
expectations to "do more with less," by resorting to PSCs. The increased use of PSCs allowed commanders to remain under theater of operation force-level caps and have sufficient combat power to achieve the mission. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the numbers of PSC personnel did not count against "force caps" or troop strength limitations, and thus minimized the public exposure as to the level of U.S. involvement. 58 Despite the intent of the legislation, senior leaders were placed in an ethical dilemma; using PSCs to meet the workplace requirements for security with reduced troop levels, or employing the U.S.
military professional as the state's sole agent of lethal force.
Subordination Settlements
The enactment of the 2008 NDAA reduced the U.S. military profession's ability to defend its jurisdiction in two ways. First, the military does not write or execute the security contracts for the multitude of other government agencies, such as DOS, and private companies that employ PSCs in a combat zone. These agencies execute their own contracts in accordance with laws that produce conflicting settlements.
Governmental agencies do implement memorandums of agreement as to how to govern PSCs, however this method only applies to those contracted by the U.S. government.
Commercial contracts remain outside of governmental purview. The large demand for contractors during the GWOT had the compounding effect of overwhelming the work capacity of the Government's contracting officers. The military contracting professionals lacked the capacity to respond to the anticipated demand foreseen in the military reduction of the 1990s. 59 Consequently, the military's professional jurisdiction over its contracting authority is being contested concurrently with the claims against its jurisdiction over the application of lethal force.
Divided Settlements
In response to the detrimental effects caused by using contractors and to prevent fiscal waste several measures have been enacted to define when contracting work is appropriate. For example, Presidential policy letter 11-01 allows any agency or department to in-source any capability they determine is essential to performing core missions regardless of comparative costs. This policy recognized that in some instances effectiveness over efficiency is appropriate and thus allowed the military the legal authority to avoid being forced to outsource its own demise. While this type of divisional settlement was intended to break the death spiral of ever increasing outsourcing of military work, it will not protect the profession of arms from further erosion. The policy does not address the root problem of inadequate DOD capacity to meet a sudden increase in demand.
These prescriptive attempts to divide and define jurisdiction in order to protect the military profession remain subject to interpretation by the practitioners in the workplace. For example, because of the large presence of military and PSC personnel working on the same task in the same workspace, migration from one profession to the other is not uncommon. 60 The greater the resources or legitimacy of one profession as compared to the other, then the greater the propensity for personnel to join the competing profession. In the case of the U.S. military inadequate jurisdiction division has three costs. First, member migration from the military profession to PSC creates a need to access, train, and equip a replacement. Second, there is the "brain drain" or loss of intellectual capital when trained U.S. military personnel depart their service in order to take higher-paying jobs working for a PSC. 61 Third, there is a credibility cost with junior military professionals when they see that market logic trumps the message of selfless and honorable service to society. Endnotes
